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The Current State of Development of the No Significant Harm Principle – How Far 
Have We Come? 
 
Prof Owen McIntyre 
School of Law 




The duty to prevent significant transboundary harm remains a cornerstone principle of 
international law, and especially of international environmental and water resources law.  
However, this rule focuses on the conduct of a State where harm originates, rather than on the 
fact that harm has resulted from such conduct, and requires that States exercise due diligence 
in anticipating and in preventing or mitigating such harm.  At a practical level, the due 
diligence standard of conduct expected of States can be uncertain and difficult to determine, 
as it must be deduced from the applicable primary rules of international environmental or 
water resources law and, in addition, it might be influenced by a range of variable factors 
which are relevant in the particular circumstances.  Such uncertainty is compounded in the 
field of international water law by the fact that the no-harm rule tends to be subordinated to 
the cardinal principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.  However, recent developments 
in international water law and related practice regarding the requirement to protect riverine 
ecosystems and maintain related ecosystem services are lending a measure of clarity as 




Few principles are more firmly established in international law generally, and in international 
environmental and water resources law more particularly, than that of the duty of States to 
prevent significant transboundary harm.  The duty of prevention, or ‘no-harm’ rule, as 
applied in an environmental context, has received the consistent support of judicial and 
arbitral tribunals since the celebrated Trail Smelter Arbitration and has become an 
omnipresent feature of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and declarative 
instruments, as well as global, regional and basin-level water resources conventions.  A 
number of factors have facilitated such universal acceptance of this rule.  For one thing, it has 
its roots in each of the major legal traditions of the world and reflects the most basic aspects 
of the law of obligations and responsibility found in every major system of national law 
McIntyre, 2007).  For another, it exemplifies the sovereign equality of States, as recognized 
in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, and the associated right of States to non-
interference with their sovereign territorial interests (Maljean-Dubois, 2011). 
 
Despite universal support in judicial deliberation and in the treaty and declarative practice of 
States, however, the no-harm rule tends to be formulated in a rather general manner, so that 
its legal and practical implications for States in seeking to comply with the requirements of 
international environmental and natural resources law have remained somewhat unclear.  In 
the specific context of international watercourses, articulations of the principle tend to be 
vague regarding its precise normative requirements for watercourse States in the utilisation 
and environmental protection of shared waters and associated aquatic ecosystems (Handl, 
1975).  In particular, international treaty instruments provide little guidance as to the nature 
or extent of the due diligence obligations that they impose upon basin States, or as to the 




It is telling that formal findings of State responsibility are something of a rarity in cases of 
harm to the sovereign interests of watercourse States, or to transboundary watercourse 
systems, despite the fact that such harm tends to produce immediate and obvious effects and 
to allow relatively easy identification of the State that is the source of such harm.  In fact, it 
appears that uncertainty regarding the precise normative implications of the key substantive 
rules and principles of international water law, including the ‘no harm’ rule, has led disputing 
States to seek to rely upon alternative legal means for the resolution of water-related disputes 
(McIntyre, 2018).  These have included the negotiation of ad hoc inter-State settlement 
arrangements, reliance upon compliance mechanisms established under international water 
resources agreements or multilateral environmental agreements, or the establishment of 
specialised treaty-based civil liability regimes for certain classes of hazardous activity.  
Nevertheless, such initiatives have had very limited success in addressing what is likely in the 
near future to become an increasingly common source of inter-State disagreement.  
 
In recent years, however, the parameters of the no-harm rule have received welcome judicial 
elaboration, at least as it applies in the context of environmental harm in international 
watercourses, which may encourage watercourse States to rely more upon it, both as a 
substantive rule guiding inter-State cooperation over shared water resources and, ultimately, 
as a ground of action in international water disputes.  Notably, the deliberations of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 2010 Pulp Mills case and the 2015 San Juan River 
cases provide some, though not entirely consistent, guidance as to the substantive and 
procedural aspects of the due diligence measures demanded of State actors under the 
principle, and of the functional interaction between each of these categories of measures.  In 
addition, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Tribunal established in the 2013 
Kishenganga Arbitration has highlighted a watercourse State’s failure to maintain minimum 
environmental flows in an international watercourse as an actionable breach of the general 
requirements of international water law.  Of greatest significance, perhaps, the 2015 and 2018 
judgments of the ICJ in the joined San Juan River cases, in which the Court recognised the 
loss of ecosystem services associated with a watercourse State’s riparian rights as amounting 
to compensable material damage, and in which the Court was prepared to quantify the 
monetary value of such ecological damage for the purpose of assessing and awarding 
compensation, may herald a new era for the no-harm principle in the field of international 
water law, and beyond, in terms of its normative clarity and of the ultimate justiciability of its 
substantive values. 
 
Origins of the ‘No-Harm’ Rule 
 
Though scholars can trace the foundations of the duty of States to prevent significant 
transboundary harm to the work of Grotius in the 17th century (Hessbruegge, 2003/4), it truly 
emerged in State, judicial and arbitral practice in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with 
recognition of the duty of States to take reasonable measures to protect aliens within their 
territory (Dunn, 1932).  This reciprocal duty evolved in step with ever greater movement of 
citizens across territorial borders as a way of compelling host States to ensure the physical 
protection of foreigners and of foreign property interests, particularly within emerging nation 
jurisdictions (ILA Study Group, 2014).  Building upon earlier international jurisprudence 
(Alabama Claims Arbitration, 1872), this duty extended from the beginning to cover harm 
caused by private actors within a host State’s territory, and comprised both a duty to protect 
foreign citizens from private criminal acts and a duty to prosecute and punish those who 
caused injury to aliens and their property.  This was apparent in the seminal Lac Lanoux case, 
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where the Arbitral Tribunal elaborated the relevant rules of international law to which ‘[a]ll 
still and running water, whether in the public or private domain, shall be subject’ (Lac 
Lanoux Arbitration, 1957, para. 1063).  It was also clear from the beginning, however, that 
the no-harm rule was a “due diligence” obligation, imposing requirements upon States in 
terms of their conduct, rather than in terms of the result to be achieved.  Thus, in the 
Wipperman Case the US-Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission stated that no State is 
responsible for acts of individuals ‘as longs as reasonable diligence is used in attempting to 
prevent the occurrence or recurrence of such wrongs’ (ILA Study Group, 2014).     
 
The application of the no-harm rule to cases of transboundary environmental damage can be 
traced back to the Trail Smelter case (Trail Smelter Arbitration, 1941), where a private 
Canadian operator located close to the US border caused significant pollution within the 
territory of the latter leading to the establishment by the two States of an arbitral tribunal to 
resolve the resulting inter-State dispute (French, 2018).  The Tribunal famously found that  
‘under the principles of international law … no State has the right to use or permit the 
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence 
and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.’  
Though the Tribunal had little need in this case to deliberate upon the nature of the preventive 
measures required to satisfy the due diligence expected of the State of origin, as the two 
States had already settled the question of Canadian legal responsibility for the effects of the 
transboundary pollution, it did accept that any due diligence standard should have regard to 
the capacity of Canada, through the deployment of emissions control technologies, to limit 
transboundary damage. (Stephens, 2009; ILA Study Group, 2014). 
    
The generally applicable customary duty of prevention as applied to environmental harm has 
been consistently endorsed in international declarative practice, notably in Principle 21 of the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration and Article 10 of the 1987 Principles and Recommendations 
adopted by the Bruntland Commission’s Expert Group on Environmental Law, and is now 
codified in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which links it to each State’s right to 
exploit its natural resources, including, presumably, freshwater resources.  Principle 2 
provides that 
‘State have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’   
The legal nature of the duty of prevention is further developed by the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention, which apply quite generally to 
‘activities not prohibited by international law which involve a risk of causing significant 
transboundary harm through their physical consequences’ (Draft Article 1), and are 
‘primarily concerned with the management of risk and emphasise the duty of cooperation and 
consultation among all States concerned’.   
 
Numerous eminent commentators have confidently concluded that the duty of prevention has 
achieved the status of customary international law (e.g. Wolfrum, 1990; Brown Weiss et al, 
1998).  Dupuy provides an articulation of the normative core of the no-harm rule ‘on the 
basis of a broad comparison of treaty law, international resolutions, and regional practice’, 
which requires that States 
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‘shall take in good faith and with all due diligence, appropriate measures to prevent 
transfrontier pollution by elaborating, in particular, rules and procedures adapted to 
the requirements of the protection of the environment, and see to it that these are 
effectively applied’ (Dupuy, 1991).  
While a detailed survey State and treaty practice in the field of international environmental 
law is entirely beyond the scope of this article, it is beyond question that the no-harm rule has 
long been firmly established in the area, so much so that ‘[w]e could almost consider that the 
other customary rules [of international environmental law] simply derive from it’ (Maljean-
Dubois, 2011).  In Pulp Mills, the ICJ appeared to regard prevention as the wellspring of a 
range of other customary environmental rules, such as that requiring environmental impact 
assessment, all of which function to discharge the due diligence obligations inherent to the 
duty of prevention (McIntyre, 2013).  At any rate, it is perfectly clear that any comprehensive 
survey of State treaty practice specifically related to international watercourses (Fuentes, 
1998) will demonstrate that  
‘watercourse States have for some considerable time included, as a matter of course, 
in instruments relating to the management and utilisation of international 
watercourses, express provisions requiring that States refrain from causing or 
permitting injury or damage to other watercourse States by virtue of environmental 
pollution’ (McIntyre, 2007). 
  
There can be no doubting judicial recognition of the status of the duty of prevention, and of 
its relevance in the field of international water law.  Recognising that ‘the principle of 
prevention, as a customary rule, has its origins in the due diligence that is required of a State 
in its territory’ (ICJ, Pulp Mills Case, 2010, para. 101), the International Court of Justice 
restated its own earlier formulation of the rule as ‘every State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’ (ICJ, Corfu 
Channel Case, 1949, p. 22).  The Court in Pulp Mills also emphatically restated its own 
earlier finding that the no-harm rule ‘is now part of the corpus of international law relating to 
the environment’ (ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, para. 29), 
which the Court clearly understands as including the sub-field of international water law.  
The Court reproduced this earlier endorsement of ‘[t]he existence of the general obligation of 
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States and of areas beyond national control’ (ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1996, para. 29) as evidence of ‘the great significance that it attaches to 
respect for the environment, not only for States but also for the whole of mankind’ (ICJ, 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997, para. 53).      
 
State responsibility for significant harm 
 
Though the ‘no-harm’ rule, and its direct applicability in the context of environmental harm 
to shared water resources, is universally accepted by States and, therefore, very firmly 
established in international law, we can point to very few water-related inter-State disputes 
which have led to a finding of responsibility on the part of one or more of the parties for 
breach of this obligation.  Despite decades of arduous work and deliberation by the 
International Law Commission (ILC, 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility; ILC, 2001 
Draft Articles on Prevention of Harm; ILC, 2006 Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the 
Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities) primarily aimed at 
clarifying the relevant secondary rules of international law on State responsibility, the 
position remains somewhat confused and inconclusive (McIntyre, 2018).  Scholars continue 
to debate the main principles and forms of State responsibility arising, including fault-based 
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responsibility, strict responsibility for unlawful acts and/or absolute responsibility for harm 
caused by extremely dangerous activities, as well as the types of harm and the categories of 
acts or omissions of States to which each might apply (Barnidge, 2006; Pisillo Mazzeschi, 
1991).   
 
However, The ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which are generally taken 
to provide the most authoritative statement on the position in customary international law, 
take an ‘essentially neutral position’ on such issues (Crawford, 2007), with Article 2 defining 
an “internationally wrongful act of a State” as ‘conduct consisting of an action or omission 
[that]: (a) is attributable to the State under international law: and (b) constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State’.  As a key architect of the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles, 
Crawford explains that ‘[i]f the primary rules require fault (of a particular character) or 
damage (of a particular kind) then they do; if not, then not’ (Crawford, 1999).  It is 
increasingly apparent, therefore, that ‘the nature of the due diligence obligation is a matter to 
be resolved by the underlying primary rules, not the secondary rules of state responsibility’ 
Barnidge, 2006).  Such “primary rules” may be described as ‘those customary or treaty rules 
laying down substantive obligations for States’, and such “secondary rules” as ‘rules 
establishing (i) on what conditions a breach of a “primary rule” may be held to have occurred 
and (ii) the legal consequences  of this breach’ (Cassese, 2005).  According to Crawford and 
Olleson, such “secondary rules” can be understood as the ‘framework for the application of 
these [primary] obligations, whatever they may be’ (Crawford and Olleson, 2005).  The 
commentary to the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility confirms this position, 
explaining that ‘[s]uch standards vary from one context to another for reasons which 
essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to 
the primary obligation’. 
    
It is quite clear that general international law relating to the use and protection of 
international watercourses creates a regime of State responsibility for breach of due diligence 
obligations owed by the State, where due diligence may be considered ‘as an objective and 
international standard of behaviour’ (Pisillo Mazzeschi, 1991), yet a standard that can only be 
identified having due regard to the particular circumstances of each case.  As Barnidge 
explains: 
‘Assuming that the primary rules at issue impose a due diligence standard of conduct 
on the state, then the nature of the rights and interests at issue, as well as a number of 
other factors, will determine whether the conduct breaches the state’s international 
obligation’ (Barnidge, 2006). 
He might easily have had in mind the ‘no-harm’ rule as applied in international water law, 
and as codified in Article 7 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and Article 2(1) of the 
1992 UNECE Water Convention, where the rule appears to be subordinated to, or at least 
informed in its application by, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, which 
requires watercourse States to take account of the water-related interests of co-riparian States 
having regard to a range of factors considered relevant in identifying and quantifying such 
interests.  The distributive nature of the equity which characterizes the apex principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization, and international water law more generally, simply 
reflects the unique dependence of people upon water as a natural resource, while the 
principle’s flexibility and resulting normative indeterminacy reflects the fact no two river 
basins are remotely similar – ecologically, hydrologically, demographically, economically, 
socially, politically or culturally.  These realities have tended to obscure the parameters of the 
due diligence standard of conduct expected of watercourse States and, as a consequence, the 
practical application of the no-harm rule in international water law.    
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It is quite clear from the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, however, that 
responsibility can arise on the basis of a State’s failure to act, as well as from affirmative 
State action.  Draft Article 2 includes within the definition of an “internationally wrongful 
act” of a State ‘conduct consisting of an action or omission’, and the ILC Commentary notes 
that ‘[c]ases in which the international responsibility of a State has been invoked on the basis 
of an omission are at least as numerous as those based on positive acts, and no difference in 
principle exists between the two’.  Therefore, where primary rules require a due diligence 
standard of State conduct, the general principles of State responsibility appear to contemplate, 
in addition to affirmative acts of State organs or officials, omissions relating to the acts of 
private legal persons.  In the specific context of international environmental or water 
resources law, such omissions might include a State’s failure to regulate or prevent pollution 
of an international watercourse or aquifer or over-abstraction of its waters by a non-State 




It is quite clear that due diligence-based standards of conduct on the part of the State are 
absolutely central to any determination of the normative content of the no-harm rule and, in 
turn, to the question of State responsibility for its breach.  However, these same standards can 
be understood as being abstract, elusive and in flux (Duvic-Paoli, 2018).  “Due diligence” is 
generally employed in international law to denote a notionally similar standard of care 
required in a range of diverse contexts.  According to one comprehensive study, the concept   
‘is concerned with supplying a standard of care against which fault can be assessed. It 
is a standard of reasonableness, of reasonable care, that seeks to take account of the 
consequences of wrongful conduct and the extent to which such consequences could 
feasibly have been avoided’ (ILA Study Group, 2016). 
Aside from its inherent flexibility, the due diligence standard allows States a degree of 
autonomy, which coheres with ideas of sovereign discretion and might generally be expected 
to encourage wider participation in treaty and customary regimes (ILA Study Group, 2016).  
Of course, an open-ended nature of standards of due diligence also offers convenience, 
obviating the need to agree precise international rules, which might prove very difficult in 
practice, and may even prove premature where State practice and practicable standards are 
still evolving.  Koskenniemi views due diligence as ‘a technique of proceduralisation, 
deferring controversial inquiries as to the content of substantive rules regulating wrongdoing 
to less controversial questions relating to informed decision-making and process’ 
(Koskenniemi, 1989; ILA Study Group, 2016).  More generally in this regard, Koskenniemi 
notes the prevalence of ‘contextual determinants … in respect of rules of State responsibility 
and especially the customary standard of due diligence’, the recent use of which he associates 
with ‘the search for equitableness [which] has affected the law on, for example, natural 
resources’ (Koskenniemi, 1989).  This search for ‘equitableness’ might be regarded as the 
defining characteristic of international water law.        
 
Generally Applicable Standards 
 
In its 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, the ILC identifies a general duty of prevention, comprising a due diligence 
obligation on the State of origin to take all reasonable preventive and/or mitigating measures.  
Draft Article 3 provides that ‘[t]he State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to 
prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof’ and 
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reflects general State practice, particularly practice in the field of international environmental 
law (ILA Study Group, 2014).  Referring expressly to Draft Article 7 of the Commission’s 
1994 Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
the Commentary to Draft Article 3 provides a very clear account of the normative nature of 
this firmly established customary obligation: 
‘The obligation of the State of origin to take preventive or minimization measures is 
one of due diligence. It is the conduct of the State of origin that will determine 
whether the State has complied with its obligation under the present articles. The duty 
of due diligence involved, however, is not intended to guarantee that significant harm 
be totally prevented, if it is not possible to do so. In that eventuality, the State … 
[must] exert its best possible efforts to minimize the risk. In this sense, it does not 
guarantee that the harm would not occur’ (ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention). 
This understanding of the nature of the duty to prevent is entirely consistent with the position 
put forward in the UN Watercourses Convention, and generally considered to be reflective of 
customary international water law, whereby prevention is secondary to, and subordinated to, 
the overarching cardinal principle of international water law, that of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation. Therefore, where a particular use of shared water resources represents the most 
equitable and reasonable allocation of the benefits deriving therefrom having regard to all 
relevant circumstances, any resulting harm to another watercourse State may have to be 
tolerated, though every effort should be made to minimize such harm and appropriate 
compensation might be due to the injured State (UN Watercourses Convention, Article 7(2)).      
 
According to the ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, ‘“[r]easonableness” is a golden thread 
in determining which measures States should take to act in a duly diligent manner’ (ILA 
Study Group, 2016), and one commentator describes due diligence as ‘a flexible 
reasonableness standard adaptable to particular facts and circumstances’ (Barnidge, 2006).  
Bearing in mind that Article 5(1) of the UN Watercourses Convention, which can safely be 
assumed to embody the cardinal rule all informing normative requirements of customary 
international water law, requires watercourse States to ‘utilize and international watercourse 
in an equitable and reasonable manner’, it is instructive that the User’s Guide to the 
Convention advises that,  
‘In determining what constitutes a reasonable use, the “reasonable man” test can be 
applied to create an objective standard against which conduct can be measured … 
Reasonableness … encompasses the contemporary conception of rationality and takes 
factors like the stage of development of a state into consideration’ (Rieu-Clarke, 
Moynihan and Magsig, 2012). 
The User’s Guide proceeds to shed some light on the functional interrelationship between the 
opaque requirements of reasonableness and equity, at least in the context of international 
water law, by explaining that ‘even if a use of an international watercourse has been 
identified as reasonable, it might still be challenged when compared with other uses through 
the lens of equity’. 
 
Closely linked to the general standard of reasonableness, is the expectation of “good 
government”, which suggests that the due diligence standard expected would involve ‘the 
reasonable measures of prevention which a well-administered government could be expected 
to exercise under similar circumstances’ (ILA Study Group, 2016).  Of course the 
reasonableness of any such expectation would be qualified to some degree by consideration 
of the State of origin’s level of development.  In turn, the linked notions of good government 
and level of development are connected to the degree of effective control which a State of 




The Commentary to ILC Draft Article 3 on Prevention provides some broad guidance on the 
normative parameters of ‘[a]n obligation of due diligence as the standard basis for the 
protection of the environment from harm’, advising, for example, that it requires policies 
which ‘are expressed in legislation and administrative regulations and implemented through 
various enforcement mechanisms’ (ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention).  Consistent with 
the Alabama Case (Alabama Claims Arbitration, 1872), however, it makes it quite clear that 
the required standard of due diligence has its basis in international law, rather than in national 
legislation, advising that ‘it imposes an obligation on the State of origin to adopt and 
implement national legislation incorporating accepted international standards’.  The State of 
origin is expected to put in place appropriate ‘administrative, financial and monitoring 
mechanisms’, requiring that it should have in place a system for the prior authorization of 
relevant activities and that it should play an active role in their regulation (ILC Draft Articles 
6 and 7 on Prevention).  Another aspect of due diligence requires that natural or juridical 
persons at ‘risk of significant transboundary harm’ should enjoy access to justice in the State 
of origin, unless the States concerned have agreed on alternative means of redress (ILC Draft 
Article 15 on Prevention).     
 
The Commentary also links Draft Article 3 to Draft Articles 9 and 10, which require inter-
State consultation on the preventive measures to be adopted, having regard to the need to 
achieve an equitable balancing of the interests of the States concerned.  In a manner strongly 
reminiscent of the international water law principle of equitable and reasonable utilization 
(UN Watercourses Convention, Article 6(1)), Draft Article 10 provides an open-ended list of 
factors relevant to such equitable balancing of States’ interests.  These include: the degree of 
risk of significant harm (including harm to the environment) and the availability of means for 
its prevention or minimization; the economic and social importance of the harmful activity in 
question; the extent to which either State might contribute to the costs of prevention; the 
economic viability of the activity in question having regard to the costs of prevention (and the 
availability of alternatives); and the standards of prevention otherwise applied by the affected 
State.  Highlighting the obvious parallels with the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization as articulated in the UN Watercourses Convention, the Commentary to Draft 
Article 10 explains that this provision ‘draws its inspiration from article 6 of the Convention 
on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses’.  It further illustrates 
the factors set out in Draft Article 10 by referring to corresponding international water law 
cases (Donauversinkung Case, 1927) and conventions (1976 Convention on the Protection of 
the Rhine against Pollution from Chlorides and 1994 Additional Protocol; 1973 Agreement 
on the Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the 
Colorado River).    
 
The Commentary to Draft Article 3 further suggests that the duty to prevent only applies to 
harm that is reasonably foreseeable, stating that ‘[i]n general, in the context of prevention, a 
State of origin does not bear the risk of unforeseeable consequences to States likely to be 
affected by activities within the scope of these articles’.  However, the Commission also 
advises that the obligation to ‘take all appropriate measures … extends to taking appropriate 
measures to identify activities which involve such a risk’.  More generally as regards a State 
of origin’s duty to ensure that it is adequately informed, the Commentary provides that ‘due 
diligence is manifested in reasonable efforts by a State to inform itself of factual and legal 
components that relate foreseeably to a contemplated procedure and to take appropriate 
measures, in timely fashion, to address them’.  In addition, the Commentary invokes the 
precautionary principle as articulated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, explaining that 
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preventive measures taken under Article 3 ‘could involve, inter alia, taking such measures as 
are appropriate by way of abundant caution, even if full scientific certainty does not exist, to 
avoid or prevent serious or irreversible damage’.  In discussing the risk of harm to the 
environment as a factor involved in the equitable balancing of interests when identifying 
appropriate preventive measures, the Commentary to Draft Article 10 also emphasizes the 
relevance of the precautionary approach.  The ILA Study Group on Due Diligence explains, 
as regards the due diligence conduct of a State of origin under the no-harm rule, that an 
injured State must demonstrate ‘that the State has not put in place the legislative and 
regulatory framework which would have enabled it to become aware of the risk, to measure 
its probability and gravity, and to take measures aimed at preventing the harm’ (ILA Study 
Group, 2014).  Clearly, measures requiring EIA of potentially harmful projects and activities 
and facilitating effective ongoing inter-State exchange of relevant water-related data and 
information have a central role to play discharging a watercourse State’s due diligence 
obligations under international water law.   
 
In each environmental context in which the concept of due diligence is employed in 
international law, a number of variable factors may dictate to some extent the standard of care 
expected of a State of origin.  The key factor is that of the degree of risk and hazard involved, 
to which the degree of care to be exercised should be proportional.  According to the ILC 
Commentary to Draft Article 3 on Prevention, ‘activities which may be considered 
ultrahazardous require a much higher standard of care in designing policies and a much 
higher degree of vigour on the part of the State to enforce them’.  The operation of this factor 
is elaborated upon somewhat in Draft Article 10(a) and (c), which requires, in the 
identification of appropriate preventive measures, a balancing of the degree of risk of 
significant transboundary (environmental) harm against the availability of means of 
preventing or minimizing such risk and the possibility of repairing the harm or restoring the 
environment.  The ILA Study Group also stresses the relative importance of the hazard 
involved, concluding: 
‘In international environmental law, a higher standard of care is required when 
inherently hazardous activities are undertaken; here, the degree of diligence varies in 
light of the level of risk. Advances in scientific understanding and technological 
capabilities can also increase the degree of care required over time’ (ILA Study 
Group, 2016).    
 
The other key factor to be taken into account in determining whether a State has exercised 
adequate due diligence is that of the State’s degree of economic development and its related 
governance and technical capacity (Trail Smelter Arbitration, 1941).   The Commentary to 
Draft Article 3 explains that  
‘It is, however, understood that the degree of care expected of a State with a well-
developed economy and human and material resources and with highly evolved 
systems and structures of governance is different from States which are not so well 
placed.’    
While this approach reflects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities set 
out in Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration, it remains clear that an economically 
underdeveloped State lacking such capacity is not exempt from its obligations under the no-
harm rule.  In every case ‘vigilance, employment of infrastructure and monitoring of 
hazardous activities in the territory of the State, which is a natural attribute of any 
Government, are expected’ (ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention).  The capacity of the 
State of origin might be particularly relevant in taking appropriate preventive measures on the 
basis of the precautionary principle (ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention).   The Seabed 
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Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, has confirmed that 
precautionary measures envisaged under Rio Principle 15 must be applied by States 
‘according to their capabilities’, though it also found that ‘[t]he reference to different 
capabilities in the Rio Declaration does not, however, apply to the obligation to follow “best 
environmental practices”’ where these are set out in an applicable measure (ITLOS, Seabed 




In its 2011 Advisory Opinion, the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber succinctly outlines the 
‘variable’ character of due diligence obligations, such as the no-ham rule: 
‘The content of “due diligence” obligations may not easily be described in precise 
terms. Among the factors that make such a description difficult is the fact that “due 
diligence” is a variable concept. It may change over time as measures considered 
sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent enough in light, for 
instance, of new scientific or technological knowledge. It may also change in relation 
to the risks involved in the activity’ (ITLOS, Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, 2011, 
para. 117).   
Therefore, while the ILC has developed authoritative secondary rules on the scope of a 
State’s international legal obligation to prevent transboundary harm, and of that State’s 
responsibility for breach thereof (ILC, 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention; ILC, 2001 Draft 
Articles on Responsibility), ‘it is to primary rules of conduct, rather than secondary rules of 
responsibility, that we must look to determine the applicable standard of behaviour’ (ILA 
Study Group, 2014).  Despite understandable concerns regarding normative fragmentation 
over divergences in the sectoral application of due diligence standards (ILA Study Group, 
2014), there is no inherent contradiction between the very general standard of due diligence 
articulated in the Corfu Channel Case and the more specific manifestations required in 
particular sub-branches of international law, such as international environmental or water 
resources law (ILA Study Group, 2014).    
 
In this regard, the ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles on Prevention expressly refers to 
provisions of a number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), from which ‘[a]n 
obligation of due diligence as the standard basis for the protection of the environment from 
harm can be deduced’, and any one of which might in the particular circumstances ‘constitute 
a necessary reference point to determine whether measures adopted are suitable’.  Creating a 
clear link to the practice of international water law, MEA provisions expressly listed include 
Article 2(1) of the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes.  Indirectly relevant provisions listed include Article 
2(1) of the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context.   
 
As a particularly environmentally progressive example of the primary rules applying to 
shared water resources, the 1992 UNECE Water Convention provides some detail regarding  
appropriate measures ‘to prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact’. Article 2 
expressly stipulates measures for the control of pollution, for ecologically sound and rational 
water management, for conservation of water resources, and for conservation and restoration 
of ecosystems.  It further provides that such measures shall be taken at source, where 
possible, and ‘shall not result in a transfer of pollution to other parts of the environment’.  In 
addition, Article 2 directs that, in taking such measures, the Parties shall be guided by the 
precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle and the principle of inter-generational 
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equity.  It requires that the Parties cooperate in this regard ‘in order to develop harmonized 
policies, programmes and strategies covering the relevant catchment areas’.  Article 3 goes 
further still, requiring that ‘the Parties shall develop, adopt, implement … relevant legal, 
administrative, economic, financial and technical measures’ for, inter alia, control of 
pollution emissions through low- and non-waste technology, licensing and monitoring of 
point-source waste water discharges, discharge limits based on best available technology, 
special requirements related to the protection of ecosystems, treatment of municipal waste 
water, application of best available technology to control nutrient inputs from point and non-
point sources, application of environmental impact assessment, protection of groundwaters, 
and contingency planning for accidental pollution.  More generally, it requires the setting of 
comprehensive emissions limits for discharges and of water-quality objectives and criteria 
and also that, in so doing, Parties have regard to those industries or hazardous substances 
controlled under existing applicable conventions or regulations. Though not quite as detailed, 
Article 21 of the UN Watercourses Convention requires States, in preventing, reducing and 
controlling pollution of an international watercourse, to take steps to harmonise their policies 
and to agree joint measures, such as: 
(a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; 
(b) Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point and non-point 
sources; 
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the waters of an 
international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored.    
Significantly, Article 20 of the Convention requires that ‘[w]atercourse States shall, 
individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of 
international watercourses’.  
 
While these two globally applicable framework water conventions provide a rich and helpful 
source of primary rules to inform the due diligence required of watercourses States under the 
duty of prevention in international water law, it is important to remember that the duty 
remains one relating to conduct rather than to result, and that certain variable factors might 
impact upon the standard of conduct expected in the circumstances.  Characterising the 
general obligation of prevention as it appears in most environmental conventions, one 
commentator observes that  
‘It is clear that such agreements do not establish the strict obligation not to pollute 
(obligation of result), but only the obligation to “endeavour” under the due diligence 
rule to prevent, control and reduce pollution.  For this reason the breach of such 
obligation involves responsibility for fault (rectius: for lack of due diligence)’ 
(Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 1991).    
 
Substantive and Procedural Due Diligence 
 
In Pulp Mills, the Court elaborated upon both the procedural and substantive aspects of the 
duty of prevention, as well as upon the intricate interrelationship between these aspects.   
Substantive requirements would include the adoption and effective enforcement of 
appropriate domestic legal controls on water abstraction or pollution or on the protection of 
the shared watercourse and its related ecosystems.  Procedural due diligence includes the 
requirements for early notification and consultation and, where necessary, negotiation in 
respect of potentially harmful planned projects or uses of international water resources.  It 
highlighted that each of these requirements could only meaningfully be performed in 
conjunction with an EIA of the likely transboundary effects.  The Court regarded procedural 
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cooperation and substantive rules as ‘intrinsically linked’ functionally (Pulp Mills case, 2010, 
para. 68), explaining that 
‘it is by cooperating that the States concerned can jointly manage the risks of damage 
to the environment that might be created by the plans initiated by one or other of 
them, so as to prevent the damage in question, through the performance of both 
procedural and substantive obligations … whereas the substantive obligations are 
frequently worded in broad terms, the procedural obligations are narrower and more 
specific, so as to facilitate the implementation …[of substantive rules] … through a 
process of continuous consultation between the parties concerned’ (Pulp Mills case, 
2010, para. 77). 
The Court has confirmed the functional interdependence of the substantive and procedural 
requirements of international water law in the joined San Juan River cases.  It stated: 
‘If the environmental impact assessment confirms that there is a risk of significant 
transboundary harm, the State planning to undertake the activity is required, in 
conformity with its due diligence obligation, to notify and consult in good faith with 
the potentially affected State, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate 
measures to prevent or mitigate that risk (San Juan River cases, 2015, paras. 104 and 
168).     
 
Ecological Due Diligence 
 
The ILA Study Group points out that ‘[t]he content of the obligation may also change in line 
with scientific and technological advances’ (ILA Study Group, 2014).  At the same time, 
once can clearly observe in the field of international water law  
‘recent growth in ecological awareness and developments in scientific understanding, 
a corresponding emphasis in State and treaty practice on the legal obligations of 
States regarding the protection and preservation of international watercourse 
ecosystems, and the emergence of sophisticated methodologies that inform the 
normative implications of such obligations’ (McIntyre, 2018; McIntyre, 2014). 
Such methodologies include the increasingly detailed parameters for assessing minimum 
environmental flows in a shared watercourse (Gooch, 2016), which have already facilitated 
judicial recognition of a corresponding legal obligation to maintain a minimum 
environmental flow regime (Kishenganga Arbitration, 2013, para. 454), and the rapidly 
evolving ecosystem services concept (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Rieu-Clarke 
and Spray, 2013), which focuses on the essential natural services furnished by functioning 
riverine ecosystems and provides a methodology for the economic and social valuation of 
natural ecosystems.  The ICJ has recently determined for the first time that ‘damage to the 
environment, and the consequent impairment or loss of the ability of the environment to 
provide goods and services, is compensable under international law’ and proceeded to assign 
a monetary value in compensation for four specific classes of ecosystem services (Certain 
Activities, 2018, paras. 42 (emphasis added) and 75-87).   
 
Ecosystems obligations are not new in international water law.  For example, the 1992 
UNECE Water Convention expressly requires Parties to apply ‘the ecosystems approach’ 
(Article 3(1)(i)) and defines the “transboundary impact”, that the Parties are to ‘take all 
appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce’ (Article 2(1)), to include ‘effects on 
human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape … or the interaction 
among these factors’ (Article 1(2)).  However, new scientific and methodological advances 
will inevitably inform the practical implications of the relevant due diligence requirements.  
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Highlighting the flexibility and adaptability of the due diligence concept, the recent ILA 
study notes that, ‘as international law develops into new, more complex areas … due 
diligence is increasingly viewed as an important tool in responding to such challenges’ (ILA 
Study Group, 2016).  It also notes that ‘[t]he extent of risk or advances in scientific 
knowledge that allow us to perceive more accurately the extent of risk (either higher or 
lower) will also influence the degree of diligence required’.  Clearly such the methodological 
developments outlined above can do much to clarify the precise nature of the conduct 
expected of a State of origin under the duty of prevention - in the specific context of 




In the field of international water law, global, regional and basin-level conventions have 
tended to address a range of problems, such as maintenance of minimum flow requirements 
(1995 Mekong River Agreement, Article 6), prevention of transboundary impacts (1992 
UNECE Water Convention, Article 2) and the protection of water quality (1994 Treaty of 
Peace between Israel and Jordan, Article 3 Annex II), thereby providing an indication of the 
full extent of the range of species of “harm” that States are required to take appropriate 
measures to prevent.  Such an extensive and diverse range of harm potentially covered by the 
duty of prevention is acknowledged by a leading authority in the field, who explains that  
‘“[h]arm” may take the form of a diminution of quantity of water, due e.g. to new 
upstream works or pumping of groundwater … [or] … could also result from, e.g. 
pollution, obstruction of fish migration, works on one bank of a contiguous 
watercourse that caused erosion of the opposite bank, increased siltation due to 
upstream deforestation or unsound grazing practices, interference with the flow 
regime, channeling of a river resulting in erosion of the riverbed downstream, conduct 
having negative impacts on the riverine ecosystem, the bursting of a dam, and other 
actions in one riparian state that have adverse effects in another, where the effects are 
transmitted by or sustained in relation to the watercourse’ (McCaffrey, 2001).      
It appears, therefore, that the obligation to prevent harm is not confined to one State’s direct 
use of a watercourse that causes harm to another State’s use thereof, as ‘activities in one State 
not directly related to a watercourse (e.g. deforestation) may have harmful effects in another 
State (e.g. flooding)’ (McCaffrey, 2001).  Similarly, the ILA’s commentary to Article X of 
the Association’s seminal Helsinki Rules notes that, for the purposes of the no-harm rule, ‘an 
injury in the territory of a State need not be connected with that States use of the waters’ 
(ILA, 1966).  As regards the significance threshold for transboundary harm that is to be 
prevented under international water law (UN Watercourses Convention, Article 7(1)), the 
ILC explained in 1988, in an era when international water law was principally concerned 
with economic uses of and benefits derived from shared water resources, that ‘[t]here must be 
a real impairment of use, i.e. a detrimental impact of some consequence upon, for example, 
public health, industry, property, agriculture or the environment in the affected State’ (ILC, 
1988).   
 
Today, however, impacts upon the functioning of aquatic ecosystems and/or loss of 
ecosystem services would certainly be included among the significant detrimental impacts 
upon the environment envisaged by the Commission (San Juan River cases, 2015).  It is quite 
clear that interference with the minimum environmental flow of an international watercourse 
could now be regarded as having caused significant harm (Kishenganga Arbitration, 2013, 
para. 454; San Juan River cases, 2015, para. 105 and 119).  Similarly, any material 
interference with or loss of ecosystem services provided by the riverine ecosystem of a shared 
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watercourse may amount to actionable significant harm.  It is notable in this regard that the 
ICJ has found in respect of four categories of ecosystem services (out of 22 types of 
ecosystem services identified in the dispute, and six types for which compensation was 
claimed) that: 
‘These activities have significantly affected the ability of the two impacted sites to 
provide the above-mentioned environmental goods and services. It is therefore the 
view of the Court that impairment or loss of these four categories of environmental 
goods and services has occurred and is a direct consequence of Nicaragua’s activities’ 




While the flexibility and adaptability required of the duty of prevention, and of the due 
diligence standard of State conduct which it implies, inevitability result in uncertainty, it must 
be recognized that this is a problem that characterizes the application of substantive rules 
across the field of international water law.  Such normative indeterminacy reflects the fact 
that no two international river basins are similar.  However, the advent of detailed rules and 
related evaluation and assessment methodologies regarding protection of international 
watercourse ecosystems and maintenance of the ecosystem services provided thereby lend a 
welcome a degree of clarity to the relevant primary rules on international water law.  This can 
only shed light on the due diligence conduct expected of watercourse States under 
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